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ABSTRACT
Executives or top management in any organization play the central role in designing 
firms’ policies including their own remuneration, investments and capital related 
decisions. Due to their prime importance, executives have greater access to all important 
information related to organizations. If such personals have greater control over the board 
or organization, it alludes as managerial power. Concisely, if managerial power is high 
then the management may misuse such information for their personal benefits. Therefore, 
considering the importance of managerial power, the current study aims to investigate the 
effects of managerial power and executive remuneration on firm performance. In order to 
empirically test the proposed relationships, the current study applied PLS-SEM approach 
by using the data of Sugar & Allied industry of Pakistan Stock Exchange for the year 
2014. The results of the current study indicated that direct effect of managerial power on 
firm performance did  not exist, however, the empirical findings showed that managerial 
power had a significant effect on executive remuneration. Furthermore, managerial power 
also significantly influenced the firm performance through the executive remuneration or 
remuneration mediated the relationship between managerial power and firm performance. 
Therefore, the current study suggests that firm should take necessary actions to reduce 
the managerial power and design the pay of 
top management in a way that any harmful 
action of managers against the firm’s wealth 
would significantly affect their own benefits.
Keywords: Executive remuneration, firm performance, 
managerial power, reflective & formative measurement 
scale 
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INTRODUCTION
As the top management or executives 
are involved in all major decisions of 
any organizations, their sincerity and 
attention are critical to the success and 
failure of organizations. Due to their prime 
importance in any organization executives, 
they must be rewarded sufficiently and 
executive remuneration must be properly 
designed, because excessive remuneration 
can lead to excessive risk-taking and 
persuade executives towards corporate 
voracity. Therefore, executive remuneration 
gets more importance and public interest 
after global financial crises.  These 
financial crises emphasize on developing 
a regulatory framework that will provide 
greater accountability and transparency 
of executives’ remuneration. Moreover, 
shareholders, stakeholders, institutional 
investors and the public at large are more 
concerned about the remuneration of 
executives and directors. Thus, governments 
of all OECD countries focus on introducing 
a mechanism that will better align the 
interest of executives with shareholders 
and firm’s performance (Ozkan, 2011). In 
short, executives’ remuneration is a critical 
element of a firm’s internal governance 
system. 
According to motivation theory, 
managers can be motivated through their 
rewards (Jensen & Murphy, 1990), as 
rewards encourage them to give their best 
in order to achieve firms’ objectives and 
take decisions which are beneficial for 
shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Consequently, remuneration plays a critical 
role in retaining and attracting competitive 
people (Conyon, 2006). Conyon (2006) 
further added that satisfactory executives’ 
remuneration motivates them to effectively 
implement firm strategies in order to 
achieve its goals efficiently (Conyon, 
2006). In general practice, the key elements 
of executive’s remuneration are: fixed 
remuneration (typically consisting of a 
salary), bonuses (generally include all the 
short-term rewards), long-term incentives 
including all stock options and deferred 
stock remuneration, others including all 
the other remuneration i.e. insurance, 
retirement benefits, club membership and 
so on (Combs et al., 2007).
Additionally, most of the existing studies 
of executive’s remuneration have been 
motivated by theories of firms. According 
to the neoclassical economic theory, profit 
maximization is the central objective of 
every organization because it generates 
monetary benefits for both shareholders 
and managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Though, managers or executives are in 
power to control the firm when firms are 
owned by separate owners than managers. 
Separation of ownership creates sufficient 
space for executives to work for their 
own interest at the expense of shareholder 
rather to focus on value maximization 
of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Crudest classic agency problem refers that 
objectives of principal and agents are not 
consistent, therefore, managers may adopt 
optimistic behavior to maximize their own 
wealth (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Hence, 
extraordinary remuneration of the executives 
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can be helpful to discourage optimistic 
behaviors, and it enhances the incentive 
remuneration in various forms (Ozkan, 
2011). Besides, in the absence of attractive 
incentives executives are unwilling to work 
for the value maximizing of principals. In 
this relation, Ozkan (2011) also said that the 
top officials apparently had the most control 
over firm’s decisions and accordingly their 
remuneration ought to be most firmly tied 
to the performance of the firm. Moreover, 
the chief executive’s remuneration is 
more sensitive to performance than the 
remuneration of other executives (Wallsten, 
2000).
Most of the previous studies come 
from developed countries (Gregory-Smith, 
2012; Li & Qian, 2011) and emphasise on 
optimal contracting approach, thus, the 
results of these studies are not generalizable 
especially for underdeveloped countries 
such as Pakistan. Therefore, the key 
intention of the authors in the current 
study is to provide a simple, theoretical 
and empirical analysis of how managerial 
power and executive remuneration affects 
firm performance in Pakistan. Moreover, the 
current study is different from other studies 
as it used data from listed companies in 
Pakistan stock exchange to investigate the 
proposed model. As there is limited existing 
literature on executives’ remuneration 
and supporting theories in the context of 
Pakistani firms. Secondly, this study focuses 
on managerial power to analyze its influence 
on remuneration by using a comprehensive 
set of dimensions that reflect the managerial 
power. Hardly any study provides evidence 
that managerial power strongly affects 
firm performance. The current study is 
trying to bridge this gap by investigating 
the relationship between managerial power 
and firm performance and is expecting 
a significant direct and indirect effect of 
managerial power on firm performance. This 
study also proposes a significant relationship 
between executive remuneration and firm 
performance as well as this study also 
investigates the mediating role of executive 
remuneration between managerial power 
and firm performance.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Managerial power depends upon various 
factors, these factors are elaborated in 
this section. According to Bebchuk et al. 
(2002), managerial power approach as 
part of agency issues refers that executives 
artfully use their remuneration for granting 
themselves more rents. Managerial power 
theory has its roots in 1932 when Berle 
and Means proposed that political and 
social forces played an important role in 
executives’ remuneration arrangements. 
Moreover, Schneider (2013) argued that 
CEOs had greater power when independent 
directors were appointed by the CEOs. They 
had the same status, or they had cross board 
(interlocking) relations and directors were 
affiliated with each other through a specific 
social and psychological mechanism. 
Hence, such directors give sufficient space 
to CEOs and executives team to influence 
their own remuneration rather than to set 
remuneration using arm’s length approach. 
According to Schneider (2013), most 
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powerful CEOs generally increase their own 
remuneration and directors with relational 
bonding with CEOs most habitually favor 
CEOs. In other words, CEOs are only able 
to significantly influence the board if there 
is a greater number of affiliated directors 
sitting on the board. For instance, an 
affiliated independent director may show 
sympathy with CEO due to the same status, 
or he/she is the friend of CEO (Bebchuk 
et al., 2002). In this case, such directors 
might be in gratitude to the CEO in return 
(Li & Qian, 2011). Similarly, Larcker et al. 
(2005) added that the affiliation of CEO 
with remuneration committee members 
led to high remuneration and as a result, 
the poor performance of the firm occured. 
In this connection, Callahan et al. (2003) 
reported a positive relationship between 
CEOs’ involvement in the selection process 
of directors and lower firm performance. 
However, affiliated directors taking a 
stand against the poorly performing CEOs 
might be able to fire such CEO. On the other 
hand, if the CEO performed effectively, 
directors most commonly tend to support 
the CEO in every decision (Bebchuk et al., 
2002). According to Choe et al. (2009), 
the excessive pay of executives that they 
extract due to their power refers to the 
rents. Admittedly, managerial power and 
rent extraction are interlinked, therefore, 
followers of managerial power approach 
reported a relationship between managerial 
power and rent extraction (Bebchuk et al., 
2002; Chalmers et al., 2006). Consequently, 
if CEOs owned a large share of the firm 
then he will have more power to influence 
the decisions of directors’ nomination 
and on their governance quality (Pinto & 
Leal, 2013). Contrarily, low shares owned 
by the CEOs or executives lead towards 
lower managerial power and other block 
shareholders play a crucial monitoring role 
to discourage CEO power (Weisbach, 2006). 
A high percentage of shares owned by the 
chief executive tends to increase executive 
power and vice versa (Agrawal & Nasser, 
2012; Weisbach, 2006; Bebchuk & Fired, 
2004). 
Furthermore, the board size also adds 
some restrictions on managerial power 
(Adams et al., 2005; Ozkan, 2011). Past 
studies provided enough evidence that larger 
board was unable to make quick decisions 
due to coordination problem and caused 
greater managerial power (Ozkan, 2011), as 
the size of board increased, the monitoring 
efficiency of that board decreased. Likewise, 
while talking about firm performance, 
scholars reported a positive relationship 
between firm performance and smaller 
boards (Conyon & Peck, 1998; Yermack, 
1996). According to Li and Qian (2011), 
the norms of behaviors in most boardrooms 
are dysfunctional and this problem becomes 
severe with the large size of the board. In 
contrast, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) argued 
that a larger board and greater representation 
of insider executives on the board might 
increase the value of a firm. Researchers 
stated that a larger board was a source 
of diverse information needed to handle 
complex problems (Conyon & Peck, 1998).
Moreover, managerial power also 
increases with CEO duality, numerous 
studies reported that CEO duality had 
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some benefits as well as some potential 
rents (Brickley et al., 1997). However, 
the cost of CEO duality is greater than the 
benefits. Some studies reported a negative 
relationship between firm performance and 
CEO duality (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). 
In contrast, Core et al., (1999) reported a 
positive relationship between duality and 
firm performance as well as several studies 
also found an insignificant relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance 
(Adams et al., 2005). Additionally, CEO 
centrality is measured through the index 
of corporate governance developed by 
Bebchuk et al., (2007), their findings 
reported a negative relationship between 
CEO centrality and firm performance. They 
measured CEO centrality as the average of 
the top five executive’s remuneration and 
power. Additionally, CEO tenure is also 
considered as another important factor 
of managerial power. Previous studies 
documented that longer tenure of CEOs had 
greater influence over the board as they had 
more information about the firms (Gregg 
et al., 2005). Longer-tenured CEOs have a 
greater affiliation with their team and board 
members. Thus, CEOs with entrenched 
tenure cause greater managerial power, 
which results in high remuneration and poor 
firm performance (Nourayi & Mintz, 2008). 
Besides, numerous studies reported 
that firms used different non-financial 
and financial measures to determine the 
executive’s remuneration, however, some 
firms prefered to rely on the single use 
of measures like economic value-added, 
earnings before interest and tax, net income 
and sales growth (Murphy, 1999). They 
also asserted that executive’s remuneration 
varies across industries, firms and countries. 
Likewise, pay practices sharply changed 
over time, with the passage of time, There 
were more pay practices and various forms of 
remuneration are introduced in businesses. 
according to Murphy and Zabojnik (2004), 
people expect that the increase in the pay 
of CEO is due to the increased power of 
managers over the corporate board. Their 
study further added that this increase in 
power allowed the CEOs to extract more 
rent from the company’s shareholders and 
offered a market-based justification for 
the rent extraction because rent extraction 
was not justifiable in business. Thus, a 
good justification of excessive executives’ 
remuneration is that the importance of 
general skills is increased, as opposed to 
firm-specific knowledge to manage modern 
corporations (Murphy & Zabojnik, 2004).
Hypotheses Development
Managerial Power and Firm Performance. 
In the current study, number of proxies has 
been used to measure the managerial power. 
These measures are concisely discussed 
in the following section. A stream of 
strategic management studies highlighted 
the importance of top executives for firm 
performance. Followers of managerial 
power theory stated that when executives had 
greater power over the board, they had less 
concern with firm performance (Bebchuk 
& Fried, 2004) because their wealth is less 
sensitive to firm performance. However, 
only a few determinants of managerial power 
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has been studied in the existing literature 
with firm performance. For instance, some 
researchers provide evidence that there is 
a positive relationship between the smaller 
board and firm performance (Combs et 
al., 2007). Most of the boardrooms are 
dysfunctional in this phenomenon, directors 
are unable to criticize the CEO’s decisions 
and this situation becomes more severe with 
the larger board size. Similarly, other studies 
found a positive relationship between less 
CEO appointed directors on board and firm 
performance (Bhagat & Black, 2001; Combs 
et al., 2007). Numerous researchers claimed 
that there is no relationship (Bhagat & Black, 
2001) or a negative association between 
firm performance and the proportion of 
independent directors on board (Combs 
et al., 2007). Furthermore, Combs et 
al. (2007) also stated that independent 
outside directors were appointed to board 
for reducing the CEO power because 
outside directors were supposed to play 
the best monitoring role. Therefore, greater 
number of outside directors causes better 
firm performance. Moreover, Michel and 
Hambrick (1992) reported a relationship 
between executive functional background 
and firm performance. Consequently, 
with regards to the association between 
CEO duality and firm performance, a 
researcher reported a potential cost of 
duality. A negative relationship between 
firm performance and CEO duality was 
reported by Bhagat and Black (2001). 
While Adams et al., (2005) found that there 
was an insignificant relationship between 
firm performance and CEO duality. In 
summary, previous studies were unable 
to provide any conclusion regarding the 
relationship between managerial power 
and firm performance, thus, current study 
hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 1: Managerial power has a 
significant effect on firm performance.
Managerial Power and Executive 
Remunerat ion.  Addi t ional ly,  two 
perceptions of executives’ remuneration 
are discussed namely, optimal contracting 
view and rent-seeking view. Here, optimal 
contracts refer to the contracts in which 
executive’s remuneration is decided under 
arm’s length agreement between the 
corporate board and executives (Bebchuk 
& Fried, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
It is further added that such contracts are 
more effective to reduce agency problems. 
Contrarily, scholars of rent-seeking view 
said that in this type of contracts, CEOs 
and executives are able to influence their 
own remuneration process (Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2003). Thus, they maximize their 
own benefits at the cost of shareholders. 
Another study argued that under rent-
seeking approach, more powerful and 
longer-tenured executives extract benefits 
from shareholders (Choe et al., 2009). 
Since CEOs have some power over board 
members and executives (Bebchuk & Fried, 
2003, 2004; Bebchuk et al., 2002). 
In other words, the rent-seeking process 
allows more powerful chief executives to 
grant themselves more secured pay (less 
pay-for-performance). The only limitation 
Managerial Power and Firm Performance through Executive Remuneration
299Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 27 (1): 293 - 309 (2019)
in the rent-seeking faced by executives is 
outrage constraint that limits the massive 
increase in pay (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; 
Choe et al., 2009). These arguments provide 
support for the implication of the managerial 
power theory. According to this theory, 
high managerial power leads towards 
low pay for performance sensitivity and 
increase in overall pay results in low firm 
performance. Thus, the managerial power 
theory has great importance in economic 
literature because it considers the power of 
top managers and then analyzes the ability 
of powerful managers to extract rents at 
the expense of shareholders (Bebchuk 
et al., 2002). Unfortunately, most of the 
existing literature paid more consideration 
to optimal contracting approach while 
studying executives’ remuneration and 
hardly paid any attention to the managerial 
power approach (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006). 
Therefore, this study hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 2: Managerial power 
has a significant impact on executive 
remuneration.
Executive Remuneration as Mediator. 
According to agency theory, the board of 
directors is appointed to monitor the actions 
of executives, fairly reward them in terms 
of remuneration and put constraints on 
managerial power (Van Essen et al., 2012). 
Agency theory assumes that executives are 
self-interested (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; 
Van Essen et al., 2012) then it can also be 
assumed that directors may also be self-
interested (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). Thus, 
self-interested directors do not play their 
monitoring role honestly due to their social 
bonding with the board and encouraging 
optimistic behavior of managers.
Moreover, managerial power theory 
stated that embedding of two important 
decision power authorities into one lead to 
more power (Ozkan, 2011) and CEOs with 
the dual role are more prone to extract rents 
from shareholders by manipulating their 
own pay contracts. Westphal and Zajac 
(1995) said that CEO with dual authorities 
had significant power over the nomination 
process of directors. According to Kaplan 
and Rauh (2010), CEO with more power 
could be able to change the pay contracts.
Furthermore, CEO tenure is another 
determinant of managerial power. Bebchuk 
and Fried (2006) stated that CEOs with 
longer tenure had more experience and 
information about the board and firm, thus, 
they were able to influence the decisions 
of the board of directors. Such CEOs, also 
influence the decision of remuneration 
committee. On the words of Yermack 
(1996), if remuneration committee was 
chaired by a director who was appointed 
after the appointment of CEO, such directors 
tended to feel sympathy with CEO and 
favored the excessive pay for CEO without 
any justification. Additionally, Gregg et al. 
(2005) reported a weak relationship between 
firm performance and longer-tenured CEOs. 
Additionally, with regard to the board 
size, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) find that as 
the board size increases the performance 
of board starts decreasing due to the delay 
in decisions, lack of unity among board 
Farheen Akram, Muhammad Abrar ul Haq and Waheed Ali Umrani
300 Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 27 (1): 293 - 309 (2019)
members and lack of communication. Thus, 
following problems with the larger board 
allow CEOs to have more power over the 
board and they will have more control over 
their pay process (O’Reilly & Main, 2010; 
Yermack, 1996). Finally, the proportion 
of independent directors on the board 
critically examines the activities performed 
by the managers or CEOs with respect to 
their reward as independent directors are 
appointed to monitor the CEOs performance 
(Ozkan, 2011). Additionally, they align the 
executive’s incentives with shareholder’s 
interest in such a way that optimistic 
behavior also brings the cost to executives. 
Conclusively, previous studies provide 
evidence for the direct relationship between 
managerial power, executive remuneration 
and firm performance. However, as per 
the literature review, no previous research 
study examined the firm performance using 
executive remuneration as mediator. Thus, 
following traditional wisdom behind the 
moderation (independent variables have a 
significant relationship with both mediator 
and dependent variables and mediator 
variable must have a significant relationship 
with the dependent variable), this study 
hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 3: Executive remuneration 
plays a mediating role between 
managerial power and firm performance.
METHODS
This study used the data of Sugar & Allied 
Industry of Pakistan Stock Exchange. 
This sector comprises 34 firms and all the 
firms are taken in the current study to test 
hypothesized relationships. In this regard, 
required data was obtained from annual 
reports, 4-traders, Bloomberg and from 
LinkedIn websites. As most of the firms 
did not provide their director’s profiles, 
therefore, information related to corporate 
governance is obtained from other sources 
as mentioned above. Meanwhile, data of 
firm performance is extracted from annual 
reports of the firms, which were downloaded 
from the company’s official websites for 
the year 2014. The current study used three 
measures of executive remuneration: equity 
remuneration (option and stock grants), 
fixed salary, and short-term remuneration 
(one-year bonus). Like the previous studies, 
this study used ratios of equity remuneration, 
short-term remuneration and fix salary to 
total remuneration. Then log of all these 
ratios was taken because the values were 
highly skewed. Executive remuneration 
includes remuneration of all top executives.
Moreover,  f i rm performance is 
measured by using ROA and ROE (log 
of total assets), and managerial power is 
measured by using the following items; 
CEO duality, CEO age, tenure (number of 
years as CEO of the current firm), shares of 
CEO, CEO appointed directors, board size, 
and independent directors. Measurement of 
dependent and independent variables were 
adopted from the study of Van Essen et al. 
(2012).
The current research applied PLS-SEM 
technique to analyze the proposed model, 
as PLS-SEM is a nonparametric technique, 
it accurately deals with small sample size, 
Managerial Power and Firm Performance through Executive Remuneration
301Pertanika J. Soc. Sci. & Hum. 27 (1): 293 - 309 (2019)
skewed data as well as complex and large 
models (Hair et al., 2014a). As in the case 
of current research, the sample size is small, 
so it can easily be handled in PLS-SEM. 
According to the requirements of the PLS-
SEM, the required sample size must be ten 
times the number of arrows pointing at a 
construct in a model (Hair et al., 2014a). 
Another reason to use PLS-SEM is that 
it deals very well with complex models 
which includes mediation or moderation and 
provide both the direct and indirect effects 
(Hair et al., 2014a). Most importantly, this 
research includes a formative construct 
in the proposed model, and PLS-SEM is 
the most appropriate method to deal with 
a formative construct (Hair et al., 2014b). 
Additionally, due to small sample size, data 
used in the current research is non-normal, 
thus, another reason behind the application 
of PLS-SEM is that it accommodates the 
skewed data (Hair et al., 2014b). 
Furthermore, in the current study, two 
constructs are measured as reflective, namely, 
managerial power and firm performance, 
however, managerial remuneration is 
measured as a formative construct with 
three indicators. A formative construct is 
composed of its items and any change in 
the items may change the whole domain 
of the construct (Hair et al., 2014a), thus, 
in case of executive remuneration, the 
current study used all the major elements 
of remuneration which collectively 
contribute in remuneration. Hence, drop 
of any of these measures of remuneration 
affects the remuneration construct and the 
evaluation of the construct will be biased. 
While considering the nature of formative 
construct and nature of remuneration, the 
current research measured the executive 
remuneration as a formative construct. The 
research framework of the current study is 
shown in Figure 1.
 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Reflective Measurement Scale
The quality of reflective scale constructs 
can be assessed through three quality 
criteria such as Cronbach’s alpha to measure 
internal consistency, the value of average 
variance extracted (AVE) and convergent 
validity. To evaluate the reliability of 
reflective construct’s items, inter-correlation 
among indicators is assessed using the 
traditional criterion approach of Cronbach’s 
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alpha.  The words of Hair et al. (2014b) 
about the cut off point for Cronbach’s alpha 
in advanced researches is ranged between 
0.70 to 0.90, but in exploratory researches, 
acceptable values are ranged between 
0.60 to 0.70. Another measure of internal 
consistency is Composite Reliability (CR), 
the rule of thumb for it is the same as for 
the Cronbach’s alpha. However, internal 
consistency measure is not applicable to 
formatively measured construct. In addition, 
AVE and convergent validity are evaluated 
using outer loadings of indicators. If the 
value of AVE ≥ 0.50 then it reflects that 
the AVE is average and reflective construct 
explains almost half of the variance of 
its indicators. Contrarily, if the value of 
AVE <0.50 then it indicates that variance 
explained by the construct is below average 
and the more proportion is consisting of 
errors (Hair et al., 2014b).
Formative Measurement Scale
Reliability test for formative constructs is 
assessed through meeting the assumption 
of multicollinearity and validity is assessed 
through the significance of outer weights of 
indicators. Multicollinearity is tested using 
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) measure. 
According to researchers, the value of VIF 
must be less than 5 and greater than 1 (Hair 
et al., 2014b). Table 1 illustrates the results 
of the measurement model.
Table 1 indicates the Cronbach alpha 
and CR values of reflective constructs which 
meet the recommended criteria of reliability. 
Table 1














CEO duality 0.698*** 32.485
0.90 0.878 0.680
CEO age 0.878*** 42.573
CEO tenure 0.891*** 23.433













Remuneration Cash 0.866*** 5.630 1.861
Equity 0.695*** 3.299 1.732
STI 0.869*** 5.667 3.200
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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The findings show that all items are equally 
reliable and independent. The value of AVE 
is also greater than the average which means 
that both reflective constructs explain more 
than the half variance. Additionally, outer 
loadings of all indicators are statistically 
significant which confirms the discriminant 
validity. Similarly, the results of formative 
construct meet the cutoff criteria, VIF value 
of all indicators of formative constructs is 
less than 5 as prescribed by the Hair et al., 
(2014b) and outer weights of indicators 
are statistically significant which confirms 
the reliability and validity of formative 
construct.
Discriminant Validity
There is a most common method to evaluate 
the discriminant validity of the constructs 
introduced by the Fornell and Larcker 
(1981). Discriminant validity is confirmed 
by the higher diagonal value of the reflective 
constructs. If the diagonal values of each 
construct are greater than its corresponding 
row and column then it confirms the 
discriminant validity of the reflective 
measurement model. However, this method 
is not appropriate for the formative scale. 
The results of discriminant validity are 
depicted in Table 2.
Structural Model
In this section results of the structural 
model of PLS-SEM are analyzed using the 
prescribed criteria by previous researchers. 
Firstly, the PLS model is run without a 
mediator variable. Theoretically, a variable 
can be used as a mediator if it fulfills the 
criteria proposed by the Baron and Kenny 
(1986). These criteria are as follows:
• Change in the independent variable 
causes a significant change in the 
mediator variable.
• Change in mediator variable causes 
a significant change in a dependent 
variable.
• After adding a mediator variable 
in the model, the previously 
established significant relationship 
between the predictor variable 
and criterion variable significantly 
change its values.
Accordingly Helm et al. (2010) and 
Sobel (1982) tests are the most common 
approach for testing the mediating effect. 
Sobel test scrutinizes the casual relationship 
between the predictor variable and criterion 
variable before and after including the 
mediator variable (Hair et al., 2014a, 
2014b). However, Sobel (1982) test has 
some limitations as it deals with the normal 
distributions, requires unstandardized path 
Table 2
Discriminant validity
Firm Performance Managerial Power Remuneration
Firm Performance 0.780
Managerial Power 0.839 0.825
Remuneration 0.904 0.795 Formative Construct
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coefficients and lacks statistical power 
(Hair et al., 2014a, 2014b). These problems 
become more crucial when it is applied to 
the small sample (Hair et al., 2014a).
Thus, the current study follows the 
Preacher and Hayes (2008) bootstrapping 
sampling distribution technique to test the 
mediating effect. This technique does not 
need normal distribution, greater statistical 
power and can be applicable to small sample 
size, therefore, best suited to PLS-SEM 
approach. Mediator analysis is done by 
following the procedure described by Hair 
et al. (2014a).
Significance of Direct and Indirect Path 
Coefficient
Table 3 depicts the significance of direct 
path coefficients.
Table 3
Path coefficient without mediator
Path β Coefficients t-Statistics
MP  FP -0.832*** 35.507
MP  REMU 0.910*** 44.362
MP= Managerial Power, FP= Firm Performance, 
REMU= Remuneration
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
The results of the whole model including 
mediator are shown in table 4.
Results from the above table indicate 
that after adding the mediating variable in 
the PLS-SEM path model, the values of 
existing relationships between independent 
and dependent variables significantly 
changed. The direct effect of managerial 
power on firm performance has not remained 
significant (β= -0.133, t-value=0.673) after 
the intervention of a mediator. As, after 
including the remuneration as a mediator in 
the model, the direct effect’s beta coefficient 
(-0.832) changed its value to -0.133.  The 
decrease in direct effect is 0.699 which is 
accounted for indirect effect and it is 84% 
of the direct effect. According to the rule of 
thumb, if the variance accounted for (VAF) 
is greater than the 80% a full mediation 
exists (Hair et al., 2014a, 2014b).
The coefficient of determination, known 
as R2, is stated in column 4 of table 4 and its 
value varies between 0 and 1. According to 
Hair et al. (2014b), it is difficult to provide 
any rule of thumb for R2, however, the 
greater value of R2 refers to the greater 
variance explained by the model. R2 value 
in this study is 0.820, which indicates that 
82% of the variance is explained due to the 
current research model.
Predictive relevance (Q2) of the model 
is obtained by using the Stone-Geisser test 
(Geisser, 1974; Stone, 1974). Q2 indicates 
Table 4
Results with mediation
Path β Coefficients t-Statistics R2 Q2 Upper Limit Lower Limit
MP FP -0.133 0.673 0.820 0.512 0.694 0.413
MP REMU 0.900*** 42.783 0.806
REMU FP 0.784*** 4.012
MP= Managerial Power, FP= Firm Performance, REMU= Remuneration
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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an adequate predictive validity of the model 
based on the criteria suggested by Hair et 
al. (2014); the value of Q2 = 0.02, 0.15 and 
0.35 refers to the small, medium and large 
predictive power of the model respectively.
In the current study, the value of 
Q2 is 0.512, which is greater than the 
recommended value of large prediction 
power thus it shows the strong prediction 
quality of the statistical model. Similarly, 
the effect size f2 evaluate the exogenous 
construct’s contribution to an endogenous 
latent variable’s R2 value. It is the rule of 
thumb that f-square (f 2) values ranging 
among, 0.02, 0.15 and 0.35 indicate that 
exogenous constructs have respectively 
small, medium or large effect sizes on an 
endogenous construct (Hair et al., 2014a, 







MP= Managerial Power, REMU= Remuneration
Hypotheses Testing
In this section, the developed hypotheses 
are tested through the significance of the 
corresponding beta coefficients. Acceptance 
or rejection of developed hypotheses is 
based upon their level of significance for 
path coefficients. The level of significance 
is to be assessed through the bootstrapping 
technique as suggested by the Hair et al. 
(2014a). The values of beta coefficients 
indicate the magnitude of change in a 
dependent variable due to the change in 
an independent variable. Values of path 
coefficients lie between -1 and +1.
Table 6
Hypotheses test
Hypotheses Path Coefficients t-Statistics Decision
MPFP -0.133 0.602 Not Accepted
MPREMU 0.900 42.082*** Accepted
MPREMUFP 0.784 3.584*** Accepted
MP= Managerial Power; REMU= Remuneration; FP= Firm Performance
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Results of the structural model for 
hypotheses test reflect some interesting 
facts. Table 6 shows that the managerial 
power has a negative effect on firm 
performance, however, this relationship is 
statistically insignificant. This statement 
is against the proposed relationship in 
hypothesis 1; as a result, hypothesis 1 (H1) 
is rejected (β= -0.133, t= 0.602). These 
unexpected results are due to the reason 
that in Pakistani firms, most of the board 
members are owners and owned a greater 
share of the firms. Although this situation 
encourages managerial power, however 
at the same time such board members 
remain concerned about their wealth 
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(dividends, share price, firm success etc.) 
which is bounded with firm performance. 
Similarly, the results of regression analysis 
indicate that the second hypothesis (H2) 
has been accepted (β= 0.900, t= 42.082, 
p=0.000<0.01). Its means that managerial 
power has a positive and significant impact 
on executive remuneration; similar results 
are found by the Van Essen et al. (2012). 
Additionally, the regression results also 
provide support for hypothesis three (H3) 
which is statistically significant (β= 0.784, 
t= 3.584, p=0.000<0.01). It indicates that 
remuneration mediates the relationship 
between managerial power and firm 
performance.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
As CEOs and other top managers hold 
important information and they have the 
power to manipulate this information 
in their favor. Consequently, in existing 
literature, some authors also argued that 
top management is the central information 
processing, managing and controlling 
part of firms. They may manipulate this 
information just for their own sake if 
they have more power and control over 
the firm and this phenomenon provides 
roots for many other problems such as 
excessive executives’ remuneration and 
poor firm performance. Therefore, the 
current study specifically was designed to 
evaluate the direct impact of managerial 
power on executive remuneration and firm 
performance and further investigate that 
how the relationship between managerial 
power and firm performance changes with 
the intervention of remuneration. For this, 
the current study collected the data from 
Sugar & Allied industry of Pakistan Stock 
Exchange for the year 2014 and processed 
this data using PLS-SEM due to the complex 
nature of the model.     
Moreover, findings of the current 
research reflect that after adding the 
mediation of executives’ remuneration, 
the direct effect of managerial power on 
firm performance is not significant in this 
study. As the findings showed that when 
mediation of executives’ remuneration was 
not added in the model, the direct effect 
of managerial power on firm performance 
was negative and highly significant (β= 
-0.832, p-value= 0.000). These results 
described that in the absence of appropriate 
rewards or remuneration, the managerial 
power became worse for firm performance. 
However, the indirect effect of managerial 
power on firm performance is found as 
positive and significant statistically. In other 
words, executive remuneration significantly 
mediates  the relat ionship between 
managerial power and firm performance. 
Due to the reason that executives with 
higher pay are more concerned with 
the firm performance because their pay 
includes higher short-term benefits such 
as bonuses that persuade them to focus on 
the performance of firms. Furthermore, the 
effect of the executive’s remuneration on 
firm performance is positive and significant 
in the current study, which means that an 
increase in firm performance is due to the 
high increase in remuneration. However, we 
found that the directors did not have enough 
long-term incentives in their pay contracts 
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and as result executives just focused on 
the short-term firm performance in order 
to justify the rise in their pay due to higher 
managerial power. This phenomenon also 
highlights that the long-term performance 
of the firms is ignored by the executives. 
Hence, firms must take the necessary 
steps to eliminate the managerial power 
for avoiding poor firm performance and 
excessive remuneration. This will only be 
possible when the board is free of the CEO’s 
control. Independent directors must work 
independently without showing sympathy 
with any top management team member. 
Despite the significance, this study 
is also subject to some limitations. Such 
as the data is based upon the specific 
sectors of Pakistan Stock Exchange as 
well as the selected sample is also small, 
therefore, the results of this study will not be 
generalizable to other sectors. Additionally, 
there may be some other variables that 
will cause the managerial power, however, 
this study included only those variables 
that were provided in the literature and 
easily available in the annual reports or 
other sources of the selected firms. So, an 
interesting expansion of the current research 
is that future researchers can use data from 
other sectors and other countries to test these 
relationships as well as they may also use a 
large data set. Future research can also be 
done by adding some new and positional 
elements of managerial power as well as 
researchers may also investigate some 
other important determinants of executive 
remunerations such as the contribution of 
remuneration committee in pay-setting 
process. 
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